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A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-
minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games 
are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential 
maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the 
prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy 
positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These 
conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-
maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the 
remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal 
winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 
84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning 
government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform 
with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the 
observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. 
Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of dominated strategies and 
strong/coalition proof Nash equilibrium are also tested. 
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1. Introduction
This paper applies recent theoretical advances in the theory of potential games to coalition
formation, derives predictions, and tests them experimentally. Our goal is to ascertain to what
extent potential maximization (a refinement of Nash equilibrium) is a useful guide in predicting
coalition formation behavior. We consider three-player games. This is the simplest setting in
which interesting coalitional structures can emerge. Moreover, the theoretical predictions for the
three-player case are unambiguous and reduce to few enough cases that exhaustive experimental
testing is feasible.
The framing of our study is coalition government formation. This provides concreteness
when discussing aspects of the coalition formation process and gives a context to the
experimental subjects. The model we consider is highly stylized but it captures fundamental
aspects that apply to government formation and other applications (e.g., corporate merges,
cartels). Namely, increasing the size of the government beyond the minimum requirement
increases the need to compromise and reduces the surplus to being in power; different members
of coalitions have more power than others and hence extract more surplus; decisions made in the
coalition formation process affect payoffs of winning members.
Players are political parties that are differentiated by exogenously given policy positions.
Policy positions are points on the Real line. This is not essential, as the theory could be redone
using the Euclidean distance between points in multiple dimensions. Assuming a one-
dimensional policy space is convenient because it allows us to classify predictions for all three-
player games in terms of just two distances. This reduces the number of cases to test
experimentally and is appropriate for the purpose at hand.
The game begins after the election is over. To avoid trivial cases, it is assumed that no
party controls a majority of the votes, and hence any two parties (or all three) control a majority.
The coalition that forms the government is the one controlling a majority of the votes cast. The
members of the government are entitled to share a surplus, which is interpreted as the value of
forming the government. The amount of the surplus depends on the policy positions of the
government members and the policy choice of the government. Assuming distinct policy
positions, adding more parties to a coalition government lowers the value of forming the
government as a greater deal of compromising is required to accommodate a wider spectrum of
beliefs. The technical implication is that the characteristic function of the coalitional game is not
superadditive.
The surplus of the coalition government is divided according to the Myerson value
(Myerson, 1977). The Myerson value is a generalization of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)
that reflects the cooperation (or link) structure within each coalition (see also Aumann &
Myerson, 1988). If all the members of a coalition are linked, the Myerson value is the same as
the Shapley value; otherwise, more weight is given to players that hold special positions in the
link structure.
The attachment of more weight to players with a special position in the link structure
makes sense in this context if links are interpreted as representing favorable, bilateral
relationships between the parties. In the model, two players are linked if and only if each of them
independently expresses a desire to cooperate with the other. It is likely that such players will
work together toward mutually beneficial outcomes in the political process. The absence of a
link between two players means that at least one player excludes the other in her proposal for the
coalition government. It is easy to imagine that there will be sore feelings between unlinked
players and that such players will draw less benefit from being in the government. Hence, it is
natural to assign less weight to players with missing links.
By using the proposed method of dividing the surplus, the government formation game is
a potential game, as defined by Monderer and Shapley (1996). A useful fact about potential
games is that only a subset of the Nash equilibria of potential games coincides with the set of
strategy profiles that maximize the potential. This renders potential maximization useful as a
refinement tool.
1
In the theoretical part of this study, we describe the predictions of potential maximization
and a variety of applicable solution concepts. Only two of the possible cooperation structures
survive potential maximization, and generically the cooperation structure selected by potential
maximization is unique: the possibilities are either a two-party government or a three-party
government with full cooperation (i.e., every pair of players is linked in the cooperation
structure). We provide conditions for either type of government. These are expressed in terms of
the size of the government surplus and the distances between parties on the policy line.
In the empirical part of this study, potential maximization is competitively tested against
other solution concepts including iterated elimination of dominated strategies and
strong/coalition proof Nash equilibrium. The data comes from a collection of experiments
conducted using student subjects at the University of Arizona. The theory neatly divides the
parameter space into three categories. We tested five games that were based on parameter
selections from each one (including three selections from one category to test the importance of
symmetry.)  We find potential maximization outperforms other refinements of Nash equilibrium
in predicting individual behavior and outcomes.
                                                          
1 See Monderer and Shapley 1996, Section 5.
Experimental studies of coalition formation have a long history in the social sciences.
Some of the early experiments were conducted by political scientists (Laing & Morrison, 1973;
Riker, 1971, 1972), psychologists (Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957),
sociologists (Gamson, 1961, 1964), economists (Murnighan & Roth, 1977, 1978), and game
theoreticians (Kalisch et al., 1954: Maschler, 1965). Many of the early studies focused on
psychological aspects of coalition formation behavior, whereas others (e.g., Kalisch et al., 1954;
Maschler, 1965) were designed to test theoretical predictions of coalition formation modeled as
games in characteristic function form (see Kahan & Rapoport, 1984, for a review of this early
experimental literature).
We follow the later studies by focusing on games that are both nonzero sum and non-
superadditive. The nonzero-sum assumption is in accordance with Riker (1967) who states “the
greater portion of political activity in forming coalitions is nonzero sum in the sense that
different minimal winning coalitions win different amounts and the loss to the loser may not
equal the gain to the winner.” Our focus on non-superadditive games reflects the idea mentioned
above that adding new members to an already winning coalition might decrease the value of the
coalition. Unlike Riker and Maschler, we do not assume that adding a new member to a winning
coalition depreciates its value to zero.  Instead, we assign the grand coalition (which is the only
non minimal winning coalition in our design) a positive value. This allows for the selection of
non-minimal winning coalitions in our model; a feature that is borne out in the experimental
results reported below.
2.  Model
Consider a parliamentary system with three parties, where each party has an exogenously given
policy position represented by a point on the real line. The policy position of each party iÎ N
={A,B,C} is denoted piÎÂ, where pA £ p B £ p C. Let p=(pA, pB, pC) denote a vector of policy
positions. Each party controls a number of seats that it won in an election. Seat shares are
assumed to be such that any two parties (or all three parties) can combine to control a majority of
the seats, but no single party has a majority. There is a surplus of G that is received by the
members of whichever coalition government forms. However, this surplus is reduced by an
amount determined by the distances between the policy positions of the coalition government
members and the position, y, chosen by the government. Specifically, the value to any coalition
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The characteristic function specified in (1) is the same as that used in Austin-Smith and Banks
(1988). We use it to define a government formation game in which parties A, B, and C are the
players. We restrict attention to parameter values for which v(S;p,G) > 0 whenever  2 ³ S . This
ensures that there is always some positive value to being able to form the government.
The strategy set of player i is denoted by  }. \ { i N S i Í = P  The empty set is included in
i P . A strategy  i i P Î p  is a set of parties with whom player i wishes to form a government. For
instance, the strategy set of player A is  { = P A Æ, B, C, {B,C}}, signifying that player A can
choose to cooperate with nobody, party B, party C, or both parties B and C. Let  . i N i P ´ = P Î
Each strategy profile  P Î = ) , , ( C B A p p p p  determines a cooperation (link) structure g(p) in the
following way. Given p Î P, a link between parties i and j forms if and only if the desire to
cooperate is mutual, i.e., if and only if  j i p Î  and  i j p Î . Denote an undirected bilateral link
between parties i and j by  j i :.  T h e n   }. : { ) ( j i j and i j i g p p p Î Î =  All parties that are
linked (directly or indirectly) in the cooperation structure that results from some strategy profile
played in the government formation game are assumed to form the coalition government.
Payoffs to each player under a given strategy profile are determined by the Myerson
values. The Myerson values for members of a coalition depend upon the characteristic function
v(p,G) and the graph g(p) resulting from the selected strategy profile, p. Given a cooperation
structure g(p) and a coalition  N S Í , let  ) ( / p g S  denote the partition of S into subsets of
players who are connected (directly or indirectly) by g(p) in S. To specify the Myerson value, let
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g p  reflects the fact that coalition S may not be able to form due to a lack of
connectedness among all the members of S. We denote the Myerson values by the vector
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is the Shapley value for player i in the game  ). , (
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g p  In summary, the government formation
game consists of players’ strategy sets PA,  PB, and PC, and their payoff functions
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3.  Theoretical Predictions
A variety of solution concepts apply to the government formation game.
2 We consider Nash
equilibrium and some of its refinements. Because of the way payoffs are defined the government
formation game is a potential game (see Qin 1996). Hence, one refinement that we consider is
potential maximization. This refinement involves finding the set of strategy profiles for the game
that maximizes the potential of the game. This set of strategy profiles is meaningful because it
always constitutes a subset of the Nash equilibria for the game. Moreover, the potential has the
property that its value increases with beneficial unilateral deviations by the players. Hence,
individual actions taken to improve own welfare lead to higher values of the potential.
 3
Potential maximization is a particularly effective refinement in this game, because it
always yields a unique prediction of the cooperation structure (and payoffs) that results from
play of the game. We also examine strong Nash equilibria (SNE), Coalition proof Nash
equilibria (CPNE), and solutions resulting from iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies (IEWDS). SNE and CPNE are less desirable as refinements since they may not be
unique and may not exist. Nevertheless, the comparisons are instructive.
                                                          
2 See Van den Nouweland (2003) for more on the refinements we discuss below.
3.1 Nash equilibria in weakly dominant strategies
The first result identifies parameter values for which each party has a weakly dominant strategy
to cooperate with the other two parties. The result is followed by a corollary that identifies the
parameter set for which full cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium in (weakly) dominant
strategies.
Proposition 1. Party A has a (weakly) dominant strategy to cooperate with parties B and C if
and only if  0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B C A
A y  and  . 0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C A B A
C y
Party B has a (weakly) dominant strategy to cooperate with parties A and C if and only if
0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B B A
A y  and  . 0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B B A
C y
Party C has a (weakly) dominant strategy to cooperate with parties A and B if and only if
0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B C A
A y  and  . 0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C A B A
C y
See Appendix A for proof. Four of the six individual conditions obtained from applying
Proposition 1 to each of the three parties are redundant. Hence, to check that all three parties
have a dominant strategy to cooperate fully it is sufficient to check only two conditions.
Corollary 1. All three parties have a (weakly) dominant strategy to cooperate with both of the
other parties if  0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B C A
A y and  . 0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C A B A
C y
                                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Further justification of potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium is provided in Garratt and Qin
(2003b).
Graphical representation:  The characteristic function v(p,G) specified in (1) is invariant to
translations of the party positions. In other words, the relative policy positions of the parties
matter, whereas the absolute policy positions do not. For this reason, and because we assume pA
£ p B £ p C, the three parameters pA, pB, and pC can be replaced with two distance parameters
A B p p d - = 1  and  . 2 B C p p d - =  Fix G. The conditions  0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B C A
A y   and
0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C A B A
C y  describe a rotated hyperbola in (d1, d2) space. The intersection of the two
graphs in 
2
+ Â  defines the set of parameter values for which every party has a dominant strategy
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We adapt the definition of potential from Monderer and Shapley (1996). A potential for a
government formation game (with parameter values  ) ,G p  is a function  Â ® P : P such that for
any i Î N, p Î P, and  ,
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The predictions of potential maximization are described below.
Proposition 2. A three-party government with complete cooperation will maximize the potential
if and only if  0 )) , ( ( ³ G p v A f  and  . 0 )) , ( ( ³ G p v C f  The two-party government {A,B}
(respectively {B,C}) will maximize the potential if and only if  0 )) , ( ( £ G p v A f  (respectively
0 )) , ( ( £ G p v C f ).
Proof is in Appendix A.
Graphical representation: Fix G. Then each of the conditions  0 )) , ( ( = G p v A f   and
0 )) , ( ( = G p v C f  describe a rotated ellipse in (d1,d2) space. The intersection of the two ellipses in
2
+ Â  defines the set of parameter values for which the potential maximizing outcome is full
cooperation (See Fig. 1).
The second statement in Proposition 2 is not surprising. It should be taken merely as an
indication of the reasonableness of the solution concept. At the same time, it is worth noting that
some well-known, sequential processes of coalition formation, such as the method described in
Austin-Smith and Banks (1988), do not have this property. Conversely, it is perhaps surprising
that the magnitude of G matters in determining whether the government will be two-party
(minimal winning) or three-party (non-minimal winning). This occurs because the Myerson
value averages marginal contributions that occur when a party enters a coalition that is already
winning with cases where the coalition is not already winning. Whenever a party joins a coalition
that is already winning, it reduces the surplus available to the coalition members. Whether or not
such instances are overridden by cases where the party is instrumental in causing a coalition to
be winning depends on the magnitude of G. The practical implication is that we expect larger
governments to be more prevalent in instances where the gains to being in power are large, and
the distances between policy positions are small.
4.  Treatment Parameters
We specified five games to be studied experimentally. The parameters selected for the five
games are shown graphically in Fig. 1. Games 1, 4, and 5 lie in the intersection of the set of
parameter values for which each party has a weakly dominant strategy to cooperate with the
other two parties and the set of parameter values for which the unique potential maximizing
strategy profile is complete cooperation. These games differ in terms of the degree of symmetry:
all three parties are seen to have the same party position in Game 1, only parties A and B are the
same in Game 4, and all three parties have different policy positions in Game 5. Game 2 lies in
the set of parameters for which potential maximization predicts a two-party coalition government
including parties A and B. Game 3 lies in the set of parameter values for which the unique
potential maximizing strategy profile is complete cooperation, but unlike games 1, 4, and 5, it
lies outside the set of parameter values for which each party has a weakly dominant strategy to
cooperate with the other two parties.
With three parties there are eight possible cooperation structures. Appendix B illustrates
the eight possible cooperation structures for each of these five games and the associated payoffs
for each of the three players. Numbers in parentheses in Appendix B indicate negative payoffs
(losses). Observe that in Games 1-4 the efficient, minimal winning government is the coalition
{A,B}, whereas in Game 5 it is the coalition {B,C}. Potential maximization predicts complete
cooperation (which is inefficient) in all but Game 2. Hence, in all but Game 2, the occurrence of
potential maximizing outcomes cannot be interpreted as a desire by subjects to maximize total
surplus.
4.1 Other solution concepts
We evaluate other solution concepts that apply to the games in Fig. 1 on a case-by-case basis.
These include SNE and CPNE, two well-known refinements of Nash equilibrium. CPNE is
defined recursively. As compared to SNE, there is an additional requirement that a deviation by a
coalition must be valid in the sense that no proper subcoalition would want to deviate from the
deviation. In this case, any proper subcoalition of a two-player coalition is a singleton. Thus, any
deviation by a two-player coalition is valid provided that deviation guarantees individual
rationality. In our games, single-player coalitions receive a payoff of zero and all two-player
coalitions yield positive payoffs for both players in the coalition (see Appendix B). Thus, SNE
and CPNE coincide for our games.
There are no strong or coalition proof Nash equilibria in Games 1, 4, and 5. All
strategy profiles in Game 2 that produce the cooperation structure A:B are both potential
maximizing and strong/coalition-proof. In Game 3, SNE/CPNE produces a subset of the Nash
equilibria that does not include the potential maximizing strategy profile: only Nash equilibrium
strategy profiles that pair parties A and B (without C) are both strong and coalition-proof.
In addition, we consider solutions obtained by IEWDS. The profile ({B,C},{A,C},{A,B})
is the sole survivor of IEWDS in Games 1, 4, and 5. It is one of the eight Nash equilibria of these
games. There are four strategy profiles in Game 2 that survive IEWDS, namely, (B,A,Æ),
(B,{A,C},Æ), ({B,C},A,Æ), and ({B,C},{A,C},Æ). Each of these four strategy profiles is a Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, each gives rise to the cooperation structure A:B, which yields the same
payoff of 270 to parties A and B (Fig. 2b). Party C cooperates with nobody in each of the strategy
profiles that survive IEWDS. There are eight strategy profiles in Game 3 that survive IEWDS.
Of these eight profiles, five are Nash equilibria; namely (B,A,Æ), (B,{A,C},Æ), ({B,C},A,Æ),
(B,A,{A,B}), and ({B,C},{A,C},{A,B}), and three are not; namely (B, {A,C}, {A,B}), ({B,C}, A,
{A,B}),  ({B,C}, {A,C}, Ø). Four of the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles that survive IEWDS in
Game 3 give rise to the cooperation structure A:B (with symmetric payoffs to players A and B,
see Fig. 2c), and the fifth gives rise to the cooperation structure A:B,B:C,A:C.
5. Experiment
To competitively test the different solution concepts, we devised a computer-controlled
experiment with payoffs contingent on performance where groups of three players each played
repeatedly the five different games identified in Appendix B. Both player roles (party A, party B,
or party C) and group membership were varied from one period to another to prevent reputation
effects.  In what follows, we describe the experimental procedure and present the results. Each
game separately does not allow a competitive test of all the theoretical predictions, but the
aggregate of the five games does allow this test.
5.1 Method
Subjects. Sixty undergraduate students from the University of Arizona participated in the
experiment. The players participated in four separate sessions each consisting of 15 members. To
allow for generality of the results, we chose subjects with different levels of sophistication or
knowledge. Sessions 1 and 2 included inexperienced undergraduate students from the school of
Business and Public Administration who volunteered to take part in a decision making
experiment for monetary reward contingent on performance. Session 3 included undergraduate
students who had some familiarity with the basic notions of non-cooperative game theory and
considerable experience in playing computer-controlled strategic games. Session 4 included
graduate students who have taken at least one course on non-cooperative game theory. Payoffs
were stated in terms of a fictitious currency called “francs” that at the end of the session were
converted into US dollars at the rate $1.00 = 200 francs for Sessions 1, 3, and 4 and $1.00 = 125
francs for Session 2. In addition to their earnings in the experiment, players of Sessions 1 and 2
received a $5.00 show-up fee, whereas players of Sessions 3 and 4 received course credit in lieu
of the show-up fee. Total earnings for Sessions 1 through 4 were $235.00, $319.00, $311.00, and
$321.00, respectively.
Procedure. All the four sessions were conducted in the Economics Science Laboratory (ESL) at
the University of Arizona. At the beginning of each session, the players drew poker chips from a
bag to randomly determine their seat assignment. Players were individually seated in the ESL,
which consists of 40 networked computer workstations in separate cubicles. Each cubicle
contains a computer monitor, keyboard, mouse, paper and pencil, and a set of written
instructions.
4 When every player in the session completed reading the instructions, the supervisor
entertained a brief question and answer period to ensure that everyone understood the operation
of the computers, game design, and payoff function. Very few questions were asked. Five
different three-player games were then presented to the players. Each game was iterated either
three (Sessions 1 and 2) or six (Sessions 3 and 4) times. The order of presentation of the games
was randomized within five-trial blocks. The same ordering of the games was used in all four
sessions to facilitate comparison between them. On each trial, the fifteen subjects in each session
were divided into five groups of three players each. Both player role and group membership were
varied from trial to trial to prevent reputation effects and provide each player the same
opportunity to participate in all three roles. A between-subject randomized design was used to
assign the players to the three roles in the game. The same assignment schedule was used for
each session.
Prior to starting the experiment, all the players in a session completed a self-paced two-
part computerized test to ensure their understanding of the game. During the first part of this test,
players were presented with the eight possible cooperation structures. For each of their four
individual strategies they were asked to identify which cooperation structure could potentially
result, given that they did not know the strategies played by the other players. The purpose of the
first part of the test was to make it clear to each player that her individual outcome depended not
only on her decision, but also on the decisions of the two other players in her group. If a question
was answered incorrectly, the player was informed of this fact and then received the correct
answer. After a player completed the first part of the test, she immediately proceeded to the
second part.
                                                          
4 To view the instructions go to http://www.eller.arizona.edu/~map/research/
In the second part of the test each player was presented with scenarios identifying all
three of the players’ strategies, including their own. They were then asked to state which
cooperation structure would (necessarily) result from the combination of these strategies. Players
were shown a non-repeating sequence of scenarios and were required to provide three
consecutive correct responses. The experiment started once all the players in the session passed
the test satisfactorily.
The pre-experimental manipulation check served two purposes. The first was to ensure
that each player fully understood the government formation game and learned how to register his
or her responses. The second and equally important purpose was to ensure that complete
understanding of the game by all players in the session was common knowledge.
Because of delays incurred during the test and inexperience with strategic thinking,
players in Sessions 1 and 2 completed only 15 trials each. The more “sophisticated” players in
Sessions 3 and 4 successfully answered the test questions considerably faster, made their
decisions quicker, and subsequently succeeded in completing 30 trials in the two-hour session.
At the beginning of each trial, all the players in a session viewed the same screen
illustrating the eight possible cooperation structures and their associated payoffs.  Below the
diagram, a statement appeared identifying their player role for that trial. Additionally, the
relevant payoffs were individually highlighted for each player role by changing the color to a
bright green. To register a choice, a player had to ‘click’ on one of four computerized buttons
representing her four possible strategies. Once selected, a ‘commit’ button appeared for the
player to confirm her decision.  Players were allowed to change their strategy choices as often as
they wished without penalty or without revealing their decision to the two other members of their
group. Once all three players confirmed their decisions, they viewed an earnings summary that
graphically depicted the resulting cooperation structure and identified the individual payoffs.
Any form of communication during the experiment was strictly forbidden.
Players were only informed of the outcome of the group in which they participated.
Information about other groups in the session was not provided. Each player could review the
outcomes of all the previous trials in which she had actually participated. Once a player
completed reviewing her results, if she chose doing so, she exited the Results screen and waited
for all other players to complete the trial. When the last player in the session completed
reviewing the Results screen, the experiment advanced to the next trial, if it was not the last.
6.  Results
Previous experience in playing computerized games and “sophistication” had significant effects
on the outcomes. We found no significant difference (t=0.31, p<0.76) in the percentage of choice
of undominated strategies (summed across the 15 trials) between Sessions 1 and 2. Similarly, we
found no significant difference (t=1.61, p<0.12) in the percentage of choice of undominated
strategies (summed across 30 trials) between Sessions 3 and 4. However, the null hypothesis of
no effect for experience in playing computer-controlled games and sophistication in game theory
was rejected (t=2.70, p<0.009) when we compared the combined frequencies in Sessions 1 and 2
with the combined frequencies in Sessions 3 and 4. As might be expected, the subjects in
Sessions 3 and 4 chose undominated strategies significantly more often. Therefore, in many of
the analyses below we differentiate between the “unsophisticated” (Sessions 1 and 2) and
“sophisticated” (Sessions 3 and 4) groups.
We found no significant difference (t=1.70,  p<0.09) in the strategy choices or game
outcomes between trials 1-15 and 16-30 in Sessions 3 and 4. Therefore, the results were
combined across trials. With 15 trials in Sessions 1, we have a total of 225 strategy choices for
each of these two sessions. The number of strategy choices per session in Sessions 3 and 4, each
including twice as many trials, is 450. When the results are combined across sessions, the
analyses of strategy choices reported below are based on a total of 1350 data points, 270 for each
of the five games. Although both group membership and player roles were varied from trial to
trial, trials within sessions cannot be considered as statistically independent. Because players
realized that they might be matched with one or more players more than once, interdependencies
cannot be ruled out.
Game Outcomes. Table 1 lists the frequencies of the game outcomes across the four sessions by
game and cooperation structure. The modal cooperation structure in Games 1, 4, and 5 is
{A:B,A:C,B:C}, whereas the one in Games 2 and 3 is {A:B}. Non-minimal winning governments
formed 98, 52, 93, and 94 percent of the time for Games 1, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. The minimal
winning government formed 83 percent of the time for Game 2.
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Table 1. Frequencies of game outcomes by cooperation structure and game.
Frequencies of Strategy Choices. Across the three player roles and four sessions, undominated
strategies were chosen with relative frequencies of 0.911, 0.903, 0.944, 0.822, and 0.844 in
Games 1- 5, respectively. However, as mentioned earlier, the “sophisticated” players of Sessions
3 and 4 chose undominated strategies significantly more often than the “unsophisticated” players
of Sessions 1 and 2. The mean (and standard deviation) of these proportions were 0.83 (0.116)
for the unsophisticated players and 0.91 (0.047) for the sophisticated players.
Table 2 breaks down the frequency of strategy choices by player role and game. The
results are combined across the four sessions. For example, players A in Game 1 chose strategies
{B}, {C}, {B,C}, and {Æ}, 5, 1, 84, and 0 times, respectively. The frequencies of undominated
strategies appear in boldface. The right-hand column of Table 2 presents the percentages of the
choices that were undominated strategies across the four sessions. Table 2 shows that
undominated strategies were chosen between 73.3% (player C in Game 2) and 100% (player B in
Game 3) of the time. In Games 1, 4, and 5, where each player had a single (weakly) dominant
strategy, these were chosen between 80% and 93.3% of the time. Although there was a general
tendency for each player to cooperate with the other two players, the players clearly
distinguished among the five games. Thus, the modal choice of player A in Game 2 was B (rather
than {B,C}), and the modal choice of player B in the same game was A (instead of {A,C}). The
third and second columns from the right display the results separately for the unsophisticated and
sophisticated players, respectively. With only two exceptions, the percentages of choice of
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Note:  Undominated strategies appear in boldface.
Table 2.  Frequency of strategy choices by player role and game.
Equilibrium Outcomes. Table 3 summarizes information about the predictive success of the
various solution concepts. Columns 1 and 2 report the frequency of Nash equilibrium and
potential maximizing strategy profiles for each game. From the data in columns 1 and 2 we can
compute how often potential maximization selects the correct Nash equilibrium in each game.
These numbers  are  reported  in  column 5.  In Games 1,  2,  4, and 5,  potential maximization  is
shown to select the correct Nash equilibrium 99, 100, 100 and 98 percent of the time. The
potential maximizing strategy profile consists of (weakly) dominant strategies in Games 1, 4, and
5, but no player has a dominant strategy in Game 2. In Game 3 the potential maximization
selects the correct Nash equilibrium only 27 percent of the time. While the percentage is
considerably lower in Game 3 than the other four games, it is worth noting that in Game 3 the
individual players A, B, and C played their unique, potential maximizing strategy 40, 46, and 70
percent of the time, respectively.
NE PotMax IEWDS SNE PotMax|NE SNE|NE
Game 1 68 67 67 -- 98.5% --
Game 2 83 83 65 83 100% 100%
Game 3 52 14 75 39 26.9% 75%
Game 4 51 51 51 -- 100% --
Game 5 53 52 52 -- 98.1% --
Table 3. Observed outcomes (across sessions).
Column 3 shows the number of times IEWDS strategy profiles were played in each
game. In each of Games 1, 4, and 5 Nash equilibria occurred that were not IEWDS less than 2
percent of the time. Nash equilibria that are not IEWDS occurred 21 percent of the time in Game
2. In Game 3, where neither solution set is a subset of the other, Nash equilibria occur 62 percent
of the time compared to 83 percent of the time for IEWDS. Deeper analysis of the data shows
that IEWDS profiles occur that are not Nash equilibria 29 times, while Nash equilibria occur that
are not IEWDS only 6 times.
Column 4 of Table 3 shows the number of times strong/coalition proof Nash equilibrium
(simply labeled SNE) strategy profiles were played in each game. Column 6 shows how often
refinement to SNE selects the correct Nash equilibrium in each game. The set of SNE is empty in
Games 1, 4, and 5. In Game 2, the set of SNE coincides with the set of potential maximizers and
hence picks the observed Nash equilibria the same number of times. In Game 3, the set of
strong/coalition proof Nash equilibria includes eight strategy profiles and does not include the
unique potential maximizer. SNE is correct 75 percent of the time, compared to 27 percent for
potential maximization.
Overall, and taking into account the differential predictability of the different solution
concepts (Table 1), there is strong support for potential maximization as a predictor of play in the
government formation game. Potential maximization does the same or better than IEWDS in four
of five games. As a refinement of Nash equilibrium it is equal to strong/coalition proofness in
Game 2 but worse in Game 3. It does very well as a refinement of Nash in Games 1, 4, and 5,
where the sets of SNE are empty. The support for potential maximization is significantly
stronger for sophisticated players. In Games 1, 2, 4, and 5 potential maximization selected the
Nash equilibrium played by sophisticated players 100 percent of the time. The percentage of
potential-maximizing Nash equilibria selected by sophisticated players in Game 3 (27 percent)
was the same as for the unsophisticated players.
In Game 1, all three players have the same policy position making it the only game that is
superadditive. There is a large body of work that predicts the formation of the grand coalition in
superadditive games.
5 Our experimental results for Game 1 are consistent with the findings of
those studies.
6.  Conclusion
We propose and experimentally test a model of government coalition formation that combines
information about the distribution of votes among the parties and their position on the policy
line. A major feature of the model is that it allows for the formation of either minimal winning or
non-minimal winning coalitions. A second major feature is that it treats the formation of a
coalition government as a non-cooperative (strategic) game. Consequently, various solution
concepts for games in strategic form may be applied and competitively tested.
                                                          
5 See, for example, Qin (1996), Slikker (2001), Slikker et al. (2000).
The experimental results support the main theoretical predictions of the paper that are
based on the premise that political parties select potential-maximizing Nash equilibria. The first
prediction is that a three-party government with full cooperation between parties will form
whenever the distance between policy positions of the parties is large relative to the value of
forming the government. We conducted four games of this sort; Games 1, 3, 4, and 5. The
theoretical predictions for Games 1, 4, and 5 are the same (see Table 1a): cooperating with both
of the others players is a weakly dominant strategy for all three players, and everyone
cooperating fully is potential maximizing as well as being the only strategy profile that survives
IEWDS. The only difference between the three games is the degree of symmetry in the policy
positions of the parties. In Game 1, all three parties are the same; in Game 4, two are different;
and in Game 5, all three have different policy positions. These differences are reflected in the
payoffs shown in Appendix B. The occurrence of the potential maximizing outcome was high in
all three of these games: potential maximization performed very well as a refinement of Nash,
being correct over 98 percent of the time in each case. This is despite the fact that in game 1 all
graphs (but the one with no links) yield the same total welfare and in games 4 and 5 the potential
maximizing solution does not maximize total welfare. There was no evidence that differences in
the degree of symmetry mattered in these games.
Full cooperation in Game 3 is predicted by potential maximization and is consistent with
IEWDS, but cooperating with both players is not a weakly dominant strategy for any of the
players. Moreover, the strategy profile that leads to full cooperation is neither strong nor
coalition proof. Here, potential maximization does poorly in terms of outcomes for the three-
player game; however, the data show that individuals played their potential maximizing strategy,
which is to cooperate with both of the other players 52 percent of the time (see Table 2). Hence,
non-minimal winning governments were still observed most often in Game 3 (see Table 1).
The second prediction is that in cases where the distance between policy positions of the
parties is small relative to the value of forming the government a minimal winning government
will form that includes the two parties closest together on the policy line. We conducted one
game of this sort, namely, Game 2. Here, potential maximization selected the observed strategy
profile over 90 percent of the time despite the fact that there are no dominant strategies; as a
refinement of Nash equilibrium potential maximization was perfect!
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.  First consider party A, and fix her strategy at {B,C}. In order for {B,C}
to be a weakly dominant strategy for party A, the strategy {B,C} must earn a payoff at least as
high as any other strategy for party A, regardless of the strategies played by the other two parties.
To show this we use the following notation. Given any graph g, let 
A
g





-A) = g} be the set of strategy pairs for B and C, which when combined with strategy




strategy {B,C} is at least as good as any other strategy for party A. This is because in this case all
strategies for player A earn a payoff of zero. Assuming players B and C play a strategy pair in
A
C B
- P : , {B,C} is at least as good as any other strategy for party A because, once again, all
strategies for party A earn a payoff of zero.
Next, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for {B,C} to be at least as good as
any other strategy for party A, given that parties B and C play strategy pairs corresponding to the
remaining six graphs. We then show that given our specification of the characteristic function in
(1), these conditions are equivalent to those in Proposition 1.  To this end, consider the set 
A
B A
- P : .
The only alternative that party A can achieve by unilateral deviation is to earn zero by changing
her strategy to one that breaks the link with player B. It follows from the specification of the
Myerson value that for {B,C} to be weakly dominant for party A, it is necessary and sufficient
that
½v({A,B})  0.                    (2)




- P :  is
½v({A,C})  0.                  (3)
Consider the set 
A
C B B A
- P : , : . In this case, link between parties B and C remains regardless of the
strategies for party A. Consequently, party A’s only alternative is to earn zero by changing her
strategy to one that breaks the link with party B. Hence, in this case, for {B,C} to be weakly
dominant for party A, it is necessary and sufficient that
          1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B})  0                                          (4)
Likewise, the condition for {B,C} to be weakly dominant for party A against strategy pairs in
A
C B C A
- P : , :  is
                  1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6v({A,C})  0        (5)
Consider the set 
A
C A B A
- P : , : . Party A has three unilateral deviations that can change her payoff. She
can earn zero by choosing a strategy that breaks the links to both players B and C, or she can
break the link to just one of the two players. If she breaks the link to player B and remains linked
to player C, she gets a payoff of ½v({A,C}).  If she breaks the link to player C and remains
linked to player B she gets a payoff of ½v({A,B}) . Hence, in this case, for {B,C} to be weakly
dominant for party A, it is necessary and sufficient that
                          1/3v(N) + 
1/6v({A,B}) + 
1/6v({A,C})  max{½v({A,C}), ½v({A,B}), 0}.          (6)
Finally, consider the set 
A
C B C A B A
- P : , : , : . Again, party A has three unilateral deviations that can
change her payoff. She can earn zero by choosing a strategy that breaks the links to both players
B and C, or she can break the link to just one of the two players.  If she breaks the link to player
B and remains linked to player C she gets a payoff of 
1/3[v(N)–v({B,C})]+
1/6v({A,C}) (since
players B and C are still linked).  If she breaks the link to player C and remains linked to player B
                                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Note that we are using g(.) as a function mapping strategy profiles to graphs and g as a graph.
she gets a payoff of 
1/3[v(N)–v({B,C})]+
1/6v({A,B}) (since players B and C are still linked).
Hence, for {B,C} to be weakly dominant for party A against strategy pairs in 
A
C B C A B A
- P : , : , :  it is
necessary and sufficient that
1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6[v({A,B}) + v({A,C})] 
max{
1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] +  
1/6v({A,B}), 
1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6v({A,C}),0}.  (7)
Conditions (2) and (3) are satisfied automatically since we assume v(S)  0 for all S ² N.  For the
same reason, the first two elements in the set on the right-hand-side of (7) are no bigger than the
left-hand-side.  Moreover, conditions (4) and (5) imply the third element is no bigger than the
left-hand-side. Hence (7) is satisfied.
The inequality is satisfied for the third element in the set on the right-hand-side of (6)
since we assume v(S)  0 for all S ² N.  The remaining conditions from (6) can be rewritten as
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B})  0                                            (8)
and
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,B})] + 
1/6v({A,C})  0                                            (9)
Given the specification of the characteristic function is (1) and the assumption pA £ pB £ p C,
v({A,B}) = G – 0.5(pB - pA)
2, v({A,C}) = G – 0.5(pC - pA)
2, v({B,C}) = G – 0.5(pC - pB)
2, and v(N)
= G – (6(pB - pA)
2 + 6(pC - pB)
2 + 10(pB - pA)(pC - pB)/9. Thus, v({A,B})  v({A,C}) and hence (5)
implies (4). Likewise, we know that v({B,C})    v({A,C}) and hence (4) implies (8).  The
remaining conditions, (5) and (9), are the ones stated in the proposition.
The same reasoning shows that (5) and (9) are also necessary and sufficient for {A,B} to
be a weakly dominant strategy for player C. We need to pay special attention to party B,
however, since party B is in the middle. For {A,C} to be a weakly dominant strategy for party B,
it is necessary and sufficient  that
½ v({A,B})  0,                                                        (10)
½ v({B,C})  0,                                                    (11)
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({B,C})  0,                                      (12)
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B})  0,                                      (13)
              1/3[v(N) + 
1/6v({A,B}) + 
1/6v({B,C})  max{½v({B,C}), ½v({A,B}),0},            (14)
and
1/3[v(N) –v({A,C})] + 
1/6[v({A,B}) + v({B,C})] 
max {
1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({B,C}), 
1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B}),0}. (15)
Conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied since v(S)  0 for all S ² N. For the same reason, the
inequality is satisfied for the first two elements in the set on the right-hand-side of (15).
Moreover, conditions (12) and (13) imply the inequality is also satisfied for third element.
Hence, (15) is satisfied. The inequality is satisfied for the third element in the set on the right-
hand-side of (14) since v(S)  0 for all S ² N. The remaining conditions from (14) can be
rewritten as
          1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B})  0                                         (16)
and
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,B})] + 
1/6v({B,C})  0                                             (17)
Given the specification for the characteristic function in (1), we know that v({A,B})  v({A,C})
and hence (17) implies (12). Likewise, we know that v({B,C})    v({A,C}) and hence (16)
implies (13).  The remaining conditions (16) and (17) are the one stated in the proposition.  ó
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the specification of the characteristic function in (1) and since pA £
pB  £ p C,  )) , ( ( )) , ( ( G p v G p v i B f f ³  for i = A,C. Hence,  0 )) , ( ( ³ G p v i f  for i = A,C implies
0 )) , ( ( ³ G p v B f . Statement 1 then follows from Remark 3(ii) of Garratt and Qin (2003a).
Now consider statement 2 of Proposition 2. Suppose  0 )) , ( ( < G p v i f  for some i Î {A,C}
so that some two-party government forms. Since pA £ pB £ pC, it must be the case that either
parties A and B are closest together on the policy line or parties B and C are closest together. Due
to the obvious similarities we only prove the case where  ). ( ) ( B C A B p p p p - < -  For any two-





}) , ({ j i p p G j i v - - =  for any i,j  Î  N. It is immediate that
}, 2 : ) ( max{ }) , ({ = = S S v B A v  and hence by Remark 3(i) in Garratt and Qin (2003a) a two-
party government including parties A and B forms. ó
Appendix B
Cooperation structures and payoffs by game.







   A
BC
Payoff for A:  225
Payoff for B:  225
Payoff for C:
Payoff for A:  0
  Payoff for B:  0
  Payoff for C:  0
Payoff for A:  225
Payoff for B:    0
Payoff for C:  225
  Payoff for A:   0
 Payoff for B:  225
 Payoff for C:  225
Payoff for A:    75
Payoff for B:  300
Payoff for C:   75
Payoff for A:    75
Payoff for B:    75
Payoff for C:  300
Payoff for A:  300
Payoff for B:    75
Payoff for C:    75
 Payoff for A:  150
 Payoff for B:  150









    Game 2
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BC
Payoff for A:  270
Payoff for B:  270
Payoff for C:    0
  Payoff for A:  0
  Payoff for B:  0
  Payoff for C:  0
Payoff for A:  90
Payoff for B:   0
Payoff for C:  90
  Payoff for A:   0
  Payoff for B:  90
  Payoff for C:  90
Payoff for A:     50
Payoff for B:   140
Payoff for C:  (130)
Payoff for A:  (10)
Payoff for B:  (10)
Payoff for C:   80
Payoff for A:   140
Payoff for B:     50
Payoff for C:  (130)
Payoff for A:    80
Payoff for B:    80















   A
BC
Payoff for A:  270
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Payoff for C:    0
3D\RIIIRU$
   Payoff for B:  0
   Payoff for C:  0
Payoff for A:  180
3D\RIIIRU%
Payoff for C:  180
  Payoff for A:    0
  Payoff for B:  180
  Payoff for C:  180
Payoff for A:    70
Payoff for B:  250
Payoff for C:  (20)
Payoff for A:    40
Payoff for B:    40
Payoff for C:  220
Payoff for A:  250
Payoff for B:    70
Payoff for C:   (20)
 Payoff for A:  130
 Payoff for B:  130
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BC
  Payoff for A:  198
  Payoff for B:  198
 Payoff for C:    0
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   Payoff for B:  0
  Payoff for C:  0
 Payoff for A:  162
 Payoff for B:    0
Payoff for C:  162
  Payoff for A:   0
  Payoff for B:  162
  Payoff for C:  162
Payoff for A:   58
Payoff for B:  220
Payoff for C:   22
Payoff for A:    46
Payoff for B:    46
Payoff for C:  208
Payoff for A:  220
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Payoff for C:    22
 Payoff for A:  112
 Payoff for B:  112
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Payoff for A:  243
Payoff for B:  243
Payoff for C:    0
    Payoff for A:  0
   Payoff for B:  0
   Payoff for C:  0
 Payoff for A:  222
 Payoff for B:    0
Payoff for C:  222
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   Payoff for B:  267
   Payoff for C:  267
Payoff for A:    43
Payoff for B:  310
Payoff for C:   67
Payoff for A:    36
Payoff for B:    81
Payoff for C:  303
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
Payoff for B:    73
Payoff for C:    52
   Payoff for A:  117
   Payoff for B:  162










Aumann, R. and R. Myerson (1988). “Endogenous formation of links between players and of
coalitions: An application of the Shapley value,” In: A. E. Roth (ed.) The Shapley Value:
Essays in Honor of Lloyd Shapley. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Austin-Smith, D. and J. Banks (1988). “Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes,”
American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, 405-422.
Gamson, W. A. (1961). “An experimental test of a theory of coalition formation,” American
Sociological Review Vol. 26, 565-573.
Gamson, W. A. (1964). “Experimental studies of coalition formation,” In: L. Berkowitz (ed.)
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Academic Press: New York.
Garratt, R. and C.-Z. Qin (2003a). “On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous
proposals,” Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 5, 1-9.
Garratt, R. and C.-Z. Qin (2003b). “On potential maximization as a refinement of Nash
equilibrium,” Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3 No. 12, 1-11.
Kahan, J. P. and Am. Rapoport (1984). “Theories of Coalition Formation,” Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates: Hillsdale New Jersey.
Kalisch, G. K., J. W. Milnor,  J. F. Nash and E. D. Nering (1954). “Some experimental n-person
Games,” In: R. M. Thrall and C. H. Coombs (eds.) Decision Processes, Wiley: New
York.
Kelley, H. H. and A. J. Arrowood (1960). “Coalitions in the triad: Critique and experiment,”
Sociometry, Vol. 23, 231-244.
Laing, J. D. and R. J. Morrison (1973). “Coalitions and payoffs in three-person sequential games:
Initial tests of two formal models,” Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Vol. 3, 3-26.
Maschler, M. (1965). “Playing an n-person game: An experiment,” Economic Research Program.
Research memorandum No. 73, Princeton, New Jersey.
Monderer, D. and L. Shapley (1996). “Potential games,” Games and Economic Behavior Vol.
14, 124 –143.
Murnighan, J. K. and A. E. Roth (1977). “The effects of communication and information
availability in an experimental study of a three-person game,” Management Science Vol.
23, 1336-1348.
Murnighan, J. K. and A. E. Roth (1978). “Large group bargaining in a characteristic function
Game,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 22, 299-317.
Myerson, R. (1977). “Graphs and cooperation in games,” Mathematics of Operations Research,
Vol. 2, 225-229.
Qin, C.-Z. (1996). “Endogenous formation of cooperation structures,” Journal of Economic
Theory, Vol. 69, 218-226.
Riker, W. H. (1967). “Bargaining in a three-person game,” American Political Science Review,
 Vol. 61, 642-656.
Riker, W. H. (1971). “An experimental examination of formal and informal rules of a three-
person game,” In: B. Lieberman (ed.) Social Choice. Gordon and Breach: New York.
Riker, W. H. (1972). “Three-person coalitions in three-person games: Experimental verification
of the theory of games,” In: J. Herndon and J. L. Brend (eds.) Mathematical Applications
in Political Science. University of Virginia Press: Charlottesville, VA.
Shapley,  L. S. (1953). “A value for n-person games,” In: H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (eds.)
Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II, Annals of Mathematics Studies No. 28.
Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Slikker, M. (2001). “Coalition formation and potential games,” Games and Economic Behavior
Vol. 37, 436-448.
Slikker, M., B. Dutta, A. van den Nouweland and S. Tijs (2000). “Potential maximizers and
network formation,” Mathematical Social Sciences Vol. 39, 55-70.
van den Nouweland, A. (2003). “Models of network formation in cooperative games,” mimeo.
Vinacke, W. E. and A. Arkoff (1957). “An experimental study of coalitions in the triad,”
American Sociological Review Vol. 22, 406-415. 
NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 






NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2003 
    
PRIV 1.2003  Gabriella CHIESA and Giovanna NICODANO: Privatization and Financial Market Development: Theoretical 
Issues 
PRIV 2.2003  Ibolya SCHINDELE: Theory of Privatization in Eastern Europe: Literature Review 
PRIV 3.2003  Wietze LISE, Claudia KEMFERT and Richard S.J. TOL: Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity 
Market 
CLIM 4.2003  Laura MARSILIANI and Thomas I. RENSTRÖM: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of 
Government Commitment 
KNOW 5.2003  Reyer GERLAGH: Induced Technological Change under Technological Competition 
ETA 6.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO: Squeezing the Interest Rate Smoothing Weight with a Hybrid Expectations Model 
SIEV 7.2003  Anna ALBERINI, Alberto LONGO, Stefania TONIN, Francesco TROMBETTA and Margherita TURVANI: The 
Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: 
Evidence from Surveys of Developers 
NRM 8.2003  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse? 
CLIM 9.2003  A. CAPARRÓS, J.-C. PEREAU and T. TAZDAÏT: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game 
with Asymmetric Information 
KNOW 10.2003  Giorgio BRUNELLO and Daniele CHECCHI: School Quality and Family Background in Italy  
CLIM 11.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Learning By Doing vs Learning By Researching in a Model of 
Climate Change Policy Analysis 
KNOW 12.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI (eds.): Economic Growth, Innovation, Cultural 
Diversity: What are we all talking about? A critical survey of the state-of-the-art 
KNOW 13.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO, Dino PINELLI and Francesco RULLANI (lix): Bio-Ecological 
Diversity vs. Socio-Economic Diversity. A Comparison of Existing Measures  
KNOW 14.2003  Maddy JANSSENS and Chris STEYAERT (lix): Theories of Diversity within Organisation Studies: Debates and 
Future Trajectories 
KNOW 15.2003  Tuzin BAYCAN LEVENT, Enno MASUREL and Peter NIJKAMP (lix): Diversity in Entrepreneurship: Ethnic and 
Female Roles in Urban Economic Life  
KNOW 16.2003  Alexandra BITUSIKOVA (lix): Post-Communist City on its Way from Grey to Colourful: The Case Study from 
Slovakia 
KNOW 17.2003  Billy E. VAUGHN and Katarina MLEKOV (lix): A Stage Model of Developing an Inclusive Community 




19.2003  Sergio CURRARINI: On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities 
PRIV 20.2003  Giacomo CALZOLARI and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Monopoly with Resale 
PRIV 21.2003  Claudio MEZZETTI (lx): Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation 
Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition 
PRIV 22.2003  Marco LiCalzi and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-
Price Auctions  
PRIV 23.2003  David ETTINGER (lx): Bidding among Friends and Enemies 
PRIV 24.2003  Hannu VARTIAINEN (lx): Auction Design without Commitment 
PRIV 25.2003  Matti KELOHARJU, Kjell G. NYBORG and Kristian RYDQVIST (lx): Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in 
Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions 
PRIV 26.2003  Christine A. PARLOUR and Uday RAJAN (lx): Rationing in IPOs 
PRIV 27.2003  Kjell G. NYBORG and Ilya A. STREBULAEV (lx): Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes 
PRIV 28.2003  Anders LUNANDER and Jan-Eric NILSSON (lx): Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative 
Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts 
PRIV 29.2003  TangaMcDANIEL and Karsten NEUHOFF (lx): Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment  
PRIV 30.2003  Emiel MAASLAND and Sander ONDERSTAL (lx): Auctions with Financial Externalities 
ETA 31.2003  Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive 
Externality NTU-Coalition Games  
KNOW 32.2003  Michele MORETTO: Competition and Irreversible Investments under Uncertainty_  
PRIV 33.2003  Philippe QUIRION: Relative Quotas: Correct Answer to Uncertainty or Case of Regulatory Capture? 
KNOW 34.2003  Giuseppe MEDA, Claudio PIGA and Donald SIEGEL: On the Relationship between R&D and Productivity: A 
Treatment Effect Analysis 
ETA 35.2003  Alessandra DEL BOCA, Marzio GALEOTTI and Paola ROTA: Non-convexities in the Adjustment of Different 
Capital Inputs: A Firm-level Investigation   GG 36.2003  Matthieu GLACHANT: Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats  
PRIV 37.2003  Narjess BOUBAKRI, Jean-Claude COSSET and Omrane GUEDHAMI: Postprivatization Corporate 
Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection 
CLIM 38.2003  Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL: Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers 
KNOW 39.2003  Slim BEN YOUSSEF: Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers and International Trade 
CTN 40.2003  Carlo CARRARO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations 
KNOW 41.2003  Sonia OREFFICE: Abortion and Female Power in the Household: Evidence from Labor Supply 
KNOW 42.2003  Timo GOESCHL and Timothy SWANSON: On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing 
Biotechnologies 
ETA 43.2003  Giorgio BUSETTI and Matteo MANERA: STAR-GARCH Models for Stock Market Interactions in the Pacific 
Basin Region, Japan and US  
CLIM 44.2003  Katrin MILLOCK and Céline NAUGES: The French Tax on Air Pollution: Some Preliminary Results on its 
Effectiveness 
PRIV 45.2003  Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Paolo PINOTTI: The Political Economy of Privatization 
SIEV 46.2003  Elbert DIJKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Burn or Bury? A Social Cost Comparison of Final Waste 
Disposal Methods 
ETA 47.2003  Jens HORBACH: Employment and Innovations in the Environmental Sector: Determinants and Econometrical 
Results for Germany 
CLIM 48.2003  Lori SNYDER, Nolan MILLER and Robert STAVINS: The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Technology 
Diffusion: The Case of Chlorine Manufacturing 
CLIM 49.2003  Lori SNYDER, Robert STAVINS and Alexander F. WAGNER: Private Options to Use Public Goods. Exploiting 
Revealed Preferences to Estimate Environmental Benefits 
CTN 50.2003  László Á. KÓCZY and Luc LAUWERS (lxi): The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension 
 
CTN 51.2003  Matthew O. JACKSON (lxi):Allocation Rules for Network Games 
CTN 52.2003  Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH (lxi): Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
CTN 53.2003  Fernando VEGA-REDONDO (lxi): Building Up Social Capital in a Changing World: a network approach 
CTN 54.2003  Matthew HAAG and Roger LAGUNOFF (lxi): On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 
CTN 55.2003  Taiji FURUSAWA and Hideo KONISHI (lxi): Free Trade Networks 
CTN 56.2003  Halis Murat YILDIZ (lxi): National Versus International Mergers and Trade Liberalization 
CTN 57.2003    Santiago RUBIO and Alistair ULPH (lxi): An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International 
Environmental Agreements 
KNOW 58.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Dino PINELLI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: ICT, Clusters and Regional Cohesion: A 
Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Research 
KNOW 59.2003    Giorgio BELLETTINI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: Special Interests and Technological Change 
ETA 60.2003  Ronnie SCHÖB: The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey 
CLIM 61.2003  Michael FINUS, Ekko van IERLAND and Robert DELLINK: Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel 
Formation Game 
GG 62.2003  Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of 
International Environmental Agreements 
SIEV 63.2003  Alberto PETRUCCI: Taxing Land Rent in an Open Economy 
CLIM 64.2003  Joseph E. ALDY, Scott BARRETT and Robert N. STAVINS: Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate 
Policy Architectures 
SIEV 65.2003  Edi DEFRANCESCO: The Beginning of Organic Fish Farming in Italy 
SIEV 66.2003  Klaus CONRAD: Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Consumers Care for the Environment 
SIEV 67.2003  Paulo A.L.D. NUNES, Luca ROSSETTO, Arianne DE BLAEIJ: Monetary Value Assessment of Clam Fishing 
Management Practices in the Venice Lagoon: Results from a Stated Choice Exercise 
CLIM 68.2003  ZhongXiang ZHANG: Open Trade with the U.S. Without Compromising Canada’s Ability to Comply with its 
Kyoto Target  
KNOW 69.2003  David FRANTZ (lix): Lorenzo Market between Diversity and Mutation 
KNOW 70.2003  Ercole SORI (lix): Mapping Diversity in Social History 
KNOW 71.2003  Ljiljana DERU SIMIC (lxii): What is Specific about Art/Cultural Projects? 
KNOW 72.2003  Natalya V. TARANOVA (lxii):The Role of the City in Fostering Intergroup Communication in a Multicultural 
Environment: Saint-Petersburg’s Case  
KNOW 73.2003  Kristine CRANE (lxii): The City as an Arena for the Expression of Multiple Identities in the Age of 
Globalisation and Migration 
KNOW 74.2003  Kazuma MATOBA (lxii): Glocal Dialogue- Transformation through Transcultural Communication 
KNOW 75.2003  Catarina REIS OLIVEIRA (lxii): Immigrants’ Entrepreneurial Opportunities: The Case of the Chinese in 
Portugal 
KNOW 76.2003  Sandra WALLMAN (lxii): The Diversity of Diversity - towards a typology of urban systems 
KNOW 77.2003  Richard PEARCE (lxii): A Biologist’s View of Individual Cultural Identity for the Study of Cities 
KNOW 78.2003  Vincent MERK (lxii): Communication Across Cultures: from Cultural Awareness to Reconciliation of the 
Dilemmas 
KNOW 79.2003  Giorgio BELLETTINI, Carlotta BERTI CERONI and Gianmarco I.P.OTTAVIANO: Child Labor and Resistance 
to Change  
ETA 80.2003  Michele MORETTO, Paolo M. PANTEGHINI and Carlo SCARPA: Investment Size and Firm’s Value under 
Profit Sharing Regulation IEM 81.2003  Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Oil and Product Dynamics in International 
Petroleum Markets 
CLIM 82.2003  Y. Hossein FARZIN and Jinhua ZHAO: Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against 
Environmental Regulation 
CLIM 83.2003  Giuseppe DI VITA: Is the Discount Rate Relevant in Explaining the Environmental Kuznets Curve? 
CLIM 84.2003  Reyer GERLAGH and Wietze LISE: Induced Technological Change Under Carbon Taxes 
NRM 85.2003  Rinaldo BRAU, Alessandro LANZA and Francesco PIGLIARU: How Fast are the Tourism Countries Growing? 
The cross-country evidence 
KNOW 86.2003  Elena BELLINI, Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI: The ICT Revolution: opportunities and risks 
for the Mezzogiorno 
SIEV 87.2003  Lucas BRETSCGHER and Sjak SMULDERS: Sustainability and Substitution of Exhaustible Natural Resources. 
How resource prices affect long-term R&D investments 
CLIM 88.2003  Johan EYCKMANS and Michael FINUS: New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of 
Global Warming 
CLIM 89.2003  Marzio GALEOTTI: Economic Development and Environmental Protection 
CLIM 90.2003  Marzio GALEOTTI: Environment and Economic Growth: Is Technical Change the Key to Decoupling? 
CLIM 91.2003  Marzio GALEOTTI and Barbara BUCHNER: Climate Policy and Economic Growth in Developing Countries 
IEM 92.2003  A. MARKANDYA, A. GOLUB and E. STRUKOVA: The Influence of Climate Change Considerations on Energy 
Policy: The Case of Russia 
ETA 93.2003  Andrea BELTRATTI: Socially Responsible Investment in General Equilibrium 
CTN 94.2003  Parkash CHANDER: The γ-Core and Coalition Formation  
IEM 95.2003  Matteo MANERA and Angelo MARZULLO: Modelling the Load Curve of Aggregate Electricity Consumption 
Using Principal Components 
IEM 96.2003  Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA, Margherita GRASSO and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Long-run Models of 
Oil Stock Prices 
CTN 97.2003  Steven J. BRAMS, Michael A.  JONES, and D. Marc KILGOUR: Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process 
Matters 
KNOW 98.2003  John CROWLEY, Marie-Cecile NAVES (lxiii): Anti-Racist Policies in France. From Ideological and Historical 
Schemes to Socio-Political Realities 
KNOW  99.2003  Richard THOMPSON FORD (lxiii): Cultural Rights and Civic Virtue  
KNOW 100.2003  Alaknanda PATEL (lxiii): Cultural Diversity and Conflict in Multicultural Cities 
KNOW 101.2003  David MAY (lxiii): The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood 
KNOW 102.2003  Sébastien ARCAND, Danielle JUTEAU, Sirma BILGE, and Francine LEMIRE (lxiii) : Municipal Reform on the 
Island of Montreal: Tensions Between Two Majority Groups in a Multicultural City 
CLIM 103.2003  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: China and the Evolution of the Present Climate Regime 
CLIM 104.2003  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in 
International Climate Agreements 
CLIM 105.2003  Anil MARKANDYA and Dirk T.G. RÜBBELKE: Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy 
NRM 106.2003  Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Management Challenges for Multiple-Species Boreal Forests 
NRM 107.2003  Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Threshold Effects in Coral Reef  Fisheries 
SIEV 108.2003  Sara ANIYAR ( lxiv): Estimating the Value of Oil Capital in a Small Open Economy: The Venezuela’s Example 
SIEV 109.2003  Kenneth ARROW, Partha DASGUPTA and Karl-Göran MÄLER(lxiv): Evaluating Projects and Assessing 
Sustainable Development in Imperfect Economies 
NRM 110.2003  Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Catarina ROSETA-PALMA(lxiv): Instabilities and Robust Control in  Fisheries  
NRM 111.2003  Charles PERRINGS and Brian WALKER (lxiv): Conservation and Optimal Use of Rangelands 
ETA 112.2003  Jack GOODY (lxiv): Globalisation, Population and Ecology 
CTN  113.2003  Carlo CARRARO, Carmen MARCHIORI and Sonia OREFFICE: Endogenous Minimum Participation in 
International Environmental Treaties 
CTN 114.2003  Guillaume HAERINGER and Myrna WOODERS: Decentralized Job Matching 
CTN 115.2003  Hideo KONISHI and M. Utku UNVER: Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems 
CTN 116.2003  Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for the Room-Mates Problem 
CTN 117.2003  Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for a Generalized Marriage Problem 
CTN 118.2003  Marita LAUKKANEN: Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty 
CTN  119.2003  Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary 
Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results 
CTN 120.2003  Gianluigi VERNASCA: Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation 
CTN 121.2003  Myrna WOODERS, Edward CARTWRIGHT and Reinhard SELTEN: Social Conformity in Games with Many 
Players 
CTN 122.2003  Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players
CTN 123.2003  Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many 
Players 
  1000  Carlo CARRARO, Alessandro LANZA and Valeria PAPPONETTI: One Thousand Working Papers  
NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2004 
    
IEM 1.2004  Anil MARKANDYA, Suzette PEDROSO and Alexander GOLUB:  Empirical Analysis of National Income and 
So2 Emissions in Selected European Countries
 
ETA 2.2004  Masahisa FUJITA and Shlomo WEBER: Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries
PRA 3.2004  Adolfo DI CARLUCCIO, Giovanni FERRI, Cecilia FRALE and Ottavio RICCHI: Do Privatizations Boost 
Household Shareholding? Evidence from Italy 
ETA 4.2004  Victor GINSBURGH and Shlomo WEBER: Languages Disenfranchisement in the European Union 
ETA 5.2004  Romano PIRAS: Growth, Congestion of Public Goods, and Second-Best Optimal Policy 
CCMP 6.2004  Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Lessons from the Polder: Is Dutch CO2-Taxation Optimal 
PRA 7.2004  Sandro BRUSCO, Giuseppe LOPOMO and S. VISWANATHAN (lxv): Merger Mechanisms 
PRA 8.2004  Wolfgang AUSSENEGG, Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): IPO Pricing with Bookbuilding, and a 
When-Issued Market  
PRA 9.2004  Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): Primary Market Design: Direct Mechanisms and Markets 
PRA 10.2004  Florian ENGLMAIER, Pablo GUILLEN, Loreto LLORENTE, Sander ONDERSTAL and Rupert SAUSGRUBER 
(lxv): The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions 
PRA 11.2004  Bjarne BRENDSTRUP and Harry J. PAARSCH (lxv): Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-
Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders 
PRA 12.2004  Ohad KADAN (lxv): Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values  
PRA 13.2004  Maarten C.W. JANSSEN (lxv): Auctions as Coordination Devices 
PRA 14.2004  Gadi FIBICH, Arieh GAVIOUS and Aner SELA (lxv): All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers 
PRA 15.2004  Orly SADE, Charles SCHNITZLEIN and Jaime F. ZENDER (lxv): Competition and Cooperation in Divisible 
Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination 
PRA 16.2004  Marta STRYSZOWSKA (lxv): Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price Internet Auctions 
CCMP 17.2004  Slim Ben YOUSSEF: R&D in Cleaner Technology and International Trade 
NRM 18.2004  Angelo ANTOCI, Simone BORGHESI and Paolo RUSSU (lxvi): Biodiversity and Economic Growth: 
Stabilization Versus Preservation of the Ecological Dynamics 
SIEV 19.2004  Anna ALBERINI, Paolo ROSATO, Alberto LONGO  and Valentina ZANATTA: Information and Willingness to 
Pay in a Contingent Valuation Study: The Value of S. Erasmo in the Lagoon of Venice 
NRM  20.2004  Guido CANDELA and Roberto CELLINI (lxvii): Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of  
Differentiated Oligopoly 
NRM  21.2004  Jacqueline M. HAMILTON (lxvii): Climate and the Destination Choice of German Tourists 
NRM  22.2004  Javier Rey-MAQUIEIRA PALMER, Javier LOZANO IBÁÑEZ  and Carlos Mario GÓMEZ GÓMEZ (lxvii): 
Land, Environmental Externalities and Tourism Development 
NRM  23.2004  Pius ODUNGA and Henk FOLMER (lxvii): Profiling Tourists for Balanced Utilization of Tourism-Based 
Resources in Kenya 
NRM  24.2004  Jean-Jacques NOWAK, Mondher SAHLI and Pasquale M. SGRO (lxvii):Tourism, Trade and Domestic Welfare 
NRM  25.2004  Riaz SHAREEF (lxvii): Country Risk Ratings of Small Island Tourism Economies 
NRM  26.2004  Juan Luis EUGENIO-MARTÍN, Noelia MARTÍN MORALES and Riccardo SCARPA (lxvii): Tourism and 
Economic Growth in Latin American Countries: A Panel Data Approach 
NRM  27.2004  Raúl Hernández MARTÍN (lxvii): Impact of Tourism Consumption on GDP. The Role of Imports  
CSRM  28.2004  Nicoletta FERRO: Cross-Country Ethical Dilemmas in Business: A Descriptive Framework 
NRM  29.2004  Marian WEBER (lxvi): Assessing the Effectiveness of Tradable Landuse Rights for Biodiversity Conservation: 
an Application to Canada's Boreal Mixedwood Forest 
NRM 30.2004  Trond BJORNDAL, Phoebe KOUNDOURI and Sean PASCOE (lxvi): Output Substitution in Multi-Species 
Trawl Fisheries: Implications for Quota Setting 
CCMP  31.2004  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA, Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on 
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part I: Sectoral Analysis of Climate Impacts in Italy 
CCMP  32.2004  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA ,Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on 
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part II: Individual Perception of Climate Extremes in Italy 
CTN  33.2004  Wilson PEREZ: Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution 
KTHC  34.2004  Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxviii): The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence 
from US Cities 
KTHC  35.2004  Linda CHAIB (lxviii): Immigration and Local Urban Participatory Democracy: A Boston-Paris Comparison 
KTHC  36.2004  Franca ECKERT COEN and Claudio ROSSI  (lxviii): Foreigners, Immigrants, Host Cities: The Policies of 
Multi-Ethnicity in Rome. Reading Governance in a Local Context 
KTHC  37.2004  Kristine CRANE (lxviii): Governing Migration: Immigrant Groups’ Strategies in Three Italian Cities – Rome, 
Naples and Bari 
KTHC  38.2004  Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxviii): Mind in Africa, Body in Europe: The Struggle for Maintaining and Transforming 
Cultural Identity - A Note from the Experience of Eritrean Immigrants in Stockholm 
ETA  39.2004  Alberto CAVALIERE: Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly 
PRA  40.2004  Andrea BIGANO and Stef PROOST: The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: 
Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
CCMP  41.2004  Micheal FINUS (lxix): International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems KTHC  42.2004  Francesco CRESPI: Notes on the Determinants of Innovation: A Multi-Perspective Analysis 
CTN  43.2004  Sergio CURRARINI and Marco MARINI: Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies 
CTN  44.2004  Marc ESCRIHUELA-VILLAR: Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability 
NRM  45.2004  Sebastian BERVOETS and Nicolas GRAVEL (lxvi): Appraising Diversity with an Ordinal Notion of Similarity: 
An Axiomatic Approach 
NRM  46.2004  Signe ANTHON and Bo JELLESMARK THORSEN (lxvi):  Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric 
Information on Private Environmental Benefits 
NRM  47.2004  John MBURU (lxvi): Wildlife Conservation and Management in Kenya: Towards a Co-management Approach 
NRM  48.2004  Ekin BIROL, Ágnes GYOVAI  and Melinda SMALE (lxvi): Using a Choice Experiment to Value Agricultural 
Biodiversity on Hungarian Small Farms: Agri-Environmental Policies in a Transition al Economy 
CCMP  49.2004  Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: The EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Allowance Prices, Trade Flows, 
Competitiveness Effects 
GG  50.2004  Scott BARRETT and Michael HOEL: Optimal Disease Eradication 
CTN  51.2004  Dinko DIMITROV, Peter BORM, Ruud HENDRICKX and Shao CHIN SUNG: Simple Priorities and Core 
Stability in Hedonic Games 
SIEV  52.2004  Francesco RICCI: Channels of Transmission of Environmental Policy to Economic Growth: A Survey of the 
Theory 
SIEV  53.2004  Anna ALBERINI, Maureen CROPPER, Alan KRUPNICK and Nathalie B. SIMON: Willingness to Pay for 
Mortality Risk Reductions: Does Latency Matter? 
NRM  54.2004  Ingo BRÄUER and Rainer MARGGRAF (lxvi): Valuation of Ecosystem Services Provided by Biodiversity 
Conservation: An Integrated Hydrological and Economic Model to Value the Enhanced Nitrogen Retention in 
Renaturated Streams 
NRM  55.2004  Timo GOESCHL and  Tun LIN (lxvi): Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and 
Regulatory Choices  
NRM 56.2004  Tom DEDEURWAERDERE (lxvi): Bioprospection: From the Economics of Contracts to Reflexive Governance 
CCMP 57.2004  Katrin REHDANZ  and David MADDISON: The Amenity Value of Climate to German Households 
CCMP 58.2004  Koen SMEKENS and Bob VAN DER ZWAAN: Environmental Externalities of Geological Carbon Sequestration 
Effects on Energy Scenarios 
NRM 59.2004  Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxvii): Using Data Envelopment 
Analysis to Evaluate Environmentally Conscious Tourism Management 
NRM 60.2004  Timo GOESCHL and Danilo CAMARGO IGLIORI (lxvi):Property Rights Conservation and Development: An 
Analysis of Extractive Reserves in the Brazilian Amazon 
CCMP 61.2004  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a 
Technology-based Climate Protocol 
NRM 62.2004  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Resource-Abundance and Economic Growth in the U.S. 
NRM 63.2004  Györgyi BELA, György PATAKI, Melinda SMALE and Mariann HAJDÚ (lxvi): Conserving Crop Genetic 
Resources on Smallholder Farms in Hungary: Institutional Analysis 
NRM 64.2004  E.C.M. RUIJGROK and E.E.M. NILLESEN (lxvi): The Socio-Economic Value of Natural Riverbanks in the 
Netherlands 
NRM 65.2004  E.C.M. RUIJGROK (lxvi): Reducing Acidification: The Benefits of Increased Nature Quality. Investigating the 
Possibilities of the Contingent Valuation Method 
ETA 66.2004  Giannis VARDAS and Anastasios XEPAPADEAS: Uncertainty Aversion, Robust Control and Asset Holdings 
GG 67.2004  Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Constadina PASSA: Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary 
Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach 
GG 68.2004  Michael FINUS: Modesty Pays: Sometimes!  
NRM 69.2004  Trond BJØRNDAL and Ana BRASÃO: The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Management and Policy 
Implications 
CTN 70.2004  Alejandro CAPARRÓS, Abdelhakim HAMMOUDI and Tarik TAZDAÏT: On Coalition Formation with 
Heterogeneous Agents  
IEM 71.2004  Massimo GIOVANNINI, Margherita GRASSO, Alessandro LANZA and Matteo MANERA: Conditional 
Correlations in the Returns on Oil Companies Stock Prices and Their Determinants 
IEM 72.2004  Alessandro LANZA,  Matteo MANERA and Michael MCALEER: Modelling Dynamic Conditional Correlations 
in WTI Oil Forward and Futures Returns 
SIEV 73.2004  Margarita GENIUS and Elisabetta STRAZZERA: The Copula Approach to Sample Selection Modelling: 
An Application to the Recreational Value of Forests 
CCMP 74.2004  Rob DELLINK and Ekko van IERLAND: Pollution Abatement in the Netherlands: A Dynamic Applied General 
Equilibrium Assessment 
ETA 75.2004  Rosella LEVAGGI and Michele MORETTO: Investment in Hospital Care Technology under Different 
Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach 
CTN 76.2004  Salvador BARBERÀ and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in
a Heterogeneous Union 
CTN 77.2004  Àlex ARENAS, Antonio CABRALES, Albert DÍAZ-GUILERA, Roger GUIMERÀ and Fernando VEGA-
REDONDO (lxx): Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion 
CTN 78.2004  Francis BLOCH and Armando GOMES (lxx): Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options CTN 79.2004  Rabah AMIR, Effrosyni DIAMANTOUDI and Licun XUE (lxx): Merger Performance under Uncertain Efficiency 
Gains 
CTN 80.2004  Francis BLOCH and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players 
CTN 81.2004  Daniel DIERMEIER, Hülya ERASLAN and Antonio MERLO (lxx): Bicameralism and Government Formation 
CTN 82.2004  Rod GARRATT, James E. PARCO, Cheng-ZHONG QIN and Amnon RAPOPORT (lxx): Potential Maximization 
and Coalition Government Formation  
 
(lix) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Mapping Diversity”, Leuven, May 16-
17, 2002 
(lx) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, 
Evidence and Applications”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, September 26-
28, 2002 
(lxi) This paper was presented at the Eighth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by 
the GREQAM, Aix-en-Provence, France, January 24-25, 2003    
(lxii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Communication across Cultures in 
Multicultural Cities”, The Hague, November 7-8, 2002 
(lxiii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Social dynamics and conflicts in 
multicultural cities”, Milan, March 20-21, 2003 
(lxiv) This paper was presented at the International Conference on “Theoretical Topics in Ecological 
Economics”, organised by the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics - ICTP, the 
Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei – FEEM 
Trieste, February 10-21, 2003 
(lxv) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, 
Evidence and Applications” organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and sponsored by the EU, 
Milan, September 25-27, 2003 
(lxvi) This paper has been presented at the 4th BioEcon Workshop on “Economic Analysis of 
Policies for Biodiversity Conservation” organised on behalf of the BIOECON Network by 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice International University (VIU) and University College London 
(UCL) , Venice, August 28-29, 2003 
(lxvii) This paper has been presented at the international conference on “Tourism and Sustainable 
Economic Development – Macro and Micro Economic Issues” jointly organised by CRENoS 
(Università di Cagliari e Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and supported by the 
World Bank, Sardinia, September 19-20, 2003 
(lxviii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Governance and Policies in 
Multicultural Cities”, Rome, June 5-6, 2003 
(lxix) This paper was presented at  the Fourth EEP Plenary Workshop and EEP Conference “The 
Future of Climate Policy”, Cagliari, Italy, 27-28 March 2003 
(lxx) This paper was presented at the 9
th Coalition Theory Workshop on "Collective Decisions and
Institutional Design" organised by the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and held in Barcelona,




  2003 SERIES 
  CLIM  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  GG  Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KNOW  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRIV  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 




  2004 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  GG  Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRA  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 